Finally getting back to my personal resolution to the free will vs. sovereignty debate. Just one more after this and I'll move on to other things.
Back in my brief stint in seminary, I was required to read portions of Louis Berkhof’s massive Systematic Theology . In it I recall reading one particular paragraph that struck me as odd in relation to foreknowledge, which of course the Arminian, (and Romans 8:29) say precedes predestination. Said Berkhof:
"The Arminian, of course, will say that he does not believe in a foreknowledge based on a decree which renders things certain, but in a foreknowledge of facts and events which are contingent on the free will of man, and therefore indeterminate. Now such a foreknowledge of the free actions of man may be possible, if man even in his freedom acts in harmony with divinely established laws, which again bring in the element of uncertainty; but it would seem to be impossible to foreknow events which are entirely dependent on the chance decision of an unprincipled will, which can at any time, irrespective of the state of the soul, of existing conditions, and of the motives that present themselves to the mind, turn in different directions. Such events can only be foreknown as bare possibilities." (Systematic Theology, p. 107)
Seems to me that what Berkhof is saying is that if God allows any sort of contingency, any sort of possibility that creatures can actually choose from more than one option, then he cannot know the future.
Here’s the problem as I saw it then, and as I see it now. This, in effect, traps God in time, and makes time something outside of God, above God. Instead of being the master and creator of time, God becomes its slave. The implication is that once God allows genuine freedom, he must spend the rest of history, the remainder of time, frantically adjusting his plan to the multitude of contingent choices humans make. If not, his perfect plan will be thwarted and his universe will descend into chaos.
As others have pointed out, this view seems to make God smaller than the Arminian view. C.S. Lewis held that God is outside of time, and this, I think, seems to be a requirement of the very definition of God. If God is outside of time, Lewis reasoned, then the future can be known, regardless of whether little human beings make free choices or not. God sees the beginning and the end. Every moment is an eternal ‘now’ to God, hence no free choice surprises him. It seems a sensible and necessary answer to Berkhof’s objection.
It is often countered at this point that if God knows what I will freely choose tomorrow, then my choice is certain, and thus not actually free. If tomorrow's free choice is a certainty from God’s perspective, then how is such “freedom” any different than determinism from a human perspective? How can I then choose anything other than what God foreknows I will choose?
The answer is simply in who “determines” the action. If God makes the choice for me, then the choice is not free. But if I make the choice, it is free even though once made the choice is fixed in time.
Example: If I have a choice between having coffee or tea with my dinner tonight, those are real choices and from the perspective of the past or present, the choice is as yet unmade. Once dinner is past and I have chosen to have tea, there is no way for me to go back and undo the choice. My decision is fixed. But it was still free.
The point is simply this: God, by virtue of being outside of time can foreknow with certainty the choices of men without making those choices for men and denying their freedom. The choices are free, though from the perspective of the end of time, at which point those choices are past, they are certain and fixed.
Though this solution seems difficult to comprehend, sort of like old Star Trek time travel episodes, but it allows genuine freedom for men, without destroying the possibility of true foreknowledge, or God’s sovereign control of the grand scope of history.
At least it satisfies me.
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