Further Thoughts on Romans 9 and Predestination

Predestination is generally an in-house debate Christians have amongst themselves and as such should not be a major discussion beyond the church doors.  But for me there is always a larger issue.   If Christianity is seen as a worldview, a "way of seeing" then the implications of a theistic determinism extend well beyond theological squabbles.   It cuts to the very heart of who we are as human beings and the meaning of the events of history.  It cuts to the very character of God.

I have long argued that one of the key proof texts for Calvinists who believe that God is sovereign in meticulously planning every event, Romans 9, is a misunderstanding of that passage based on failing to fully appreciate the context.  And one of the key proof texts for divine determinism actually proves the opposite point when connected to its Old Testament roots.

The primary question of the book of Romans, particularly chapters 9-11, is whether God is breaking a promise to Israel in granting grace to the Gentiles.   Why should anyone object to grace?  He states it is "not a matter of man's willing or running" - it is not of the law.  

In this context of mercy Paul does mention Pharaoh and a "hardening" of his heart.    Specifically in vs 18, Paul notes "He has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires"  (NASB)

Context matters.  The idea of "Hardening" should be considered in light of Romans 1, where in reference to the entire race, Paul says God "gave them over" to depraved mind, a consequence of not acknowledging God.  It should also take into account Romans 11 where the blindness of the Jews serves a purpose in reaching the gentiles but the state of national Israel's unbelief is not irreversible.

But the key passage is next in v19-25:

I Think, Therefore ...

At Discovery Institute, Michael Egnor takes note of the inherent self contradictions in materialism in the article Descarte's Blunder.  We are all aware of Descarte's famous "I think therefore I am" phrase.  The idea being one has to exist to think.  Egnor flips the script, or more accurately, points it back a step.  

"Notice that we cannot conclude that we exist unless we can conclude. That is, we must first know the principle of non-contradiction — that being is not non-being — before we can conclude that “I think therefore I am.”

The idea that "A" cannot be "non-A" is a necessary axiom for any knowledge.   If we can't distinguish between this and that, we simply can't think.